Following yesterday’s guest blog by Christopher Agnew, we welcome another guest poster, Tim Haddow of Edinburgh University’s Law Students’ Council, who provides an alternative view of the debate over fair access to the legal profession.

Paid Traineeships – Levelling the playing field

Firms must now pay trainees at least the minimum wage. The Law Society of Scotland’s new policy reflects the need to ensure all training opportunities were available to all, not just those with the financial resources to allow them to work unpaid. In yesterday’s guest post, Christopher Agnew argued that this may just add to the difficulties faced by those understandably desperate to start their intended career after four years of undergraduate study and an expensive Diploma in Professional Legal Practice (DPLP).

I think the new policy is required to prevent less well-off candidates being excluded but the experience of recent DPLP graduates such as Christopher certainly shows there must be whole-scale review of the route into the legal profession. The waste of talent, time and money inherent in the current system is shameful. But focusing on training contracts overlooks a more significant and insidious bias towards means rather than merit: the cost to students of undertaking the DPLP.

Making it onto the pitch in the first place

Obtaining a DPLP costs around £12,000. Fees and compulsory course materials cost nearly £7,000; living costs for the year of study make up the balance. A small government loan of £3,400 towards fees is the only assistance available as, unlike students on a teaching diploma, DPLP students are not eligible for student loans for maintenance. Following a recent review, the fees contribution was extended. But, bizarrely, the Scottish Government chose not to increase the contribution to better reflect the actual fees charged, nor to target assistance at those who needed it most. Instead the money was merely made available to all DPLP students, rather than limiting assistance to the 300 most academically able students applying that year.

The resultant DPLP funding gap of £8,000 to £10,000 must be met by students themselves. For those without the support of a well-off family, this is a daunting prospect. A few with good credit ratings and secure offers of training contracts with big firms may take on commercial debt. The majority will probably decide that the DPLP is a risk they cannot take.

These students will never compete for training contracts with their more privileged peers. No matter how bright or able, they will be lost to the profession. The Universities may be doing great outreach work in breaking down barriers to Higher Education: 10-15% of Edinburgh’s law undergraduates now come from those otherwise unlikely to go to University. But this will not feed through into the profession. No wonder Douglas Mill, former Chief Executive of the Law Society and current Director of Professional Legal Practice at Glasgow University, warned “we’re in danger of reverting to being an upper middle class profession.”

This is why a sole focus on training contracts misses the point: it does not matter if the playing field is level if you cannot make it onto the pitch.

What needs done?

In the longer term, the DPLP must be part of the re-design of legal training argued for above. But action is needed now to re-open the route to the profession for those who cannot be supported through the DPLP by their families. The Scottish Government must accept that its well intentioned change to postgraduate funding has, if anything, made access to the profession more difficult for those students who most require support.

But a simple short-term solution does exist: extending eligibility to the undergraduate student loan to DPLP students would make huge inroads into the funding gap. The change could implemented quickly and would be provided through existing systems and procedures. Means testing of student loans ensures only those who really need the help benefit. A precedent already exists with postgraduate teacher training.

Lobbying the Scottish Government for this action is the focus of the University of Edinburgh Law Students’ Council’s current campaign. Our message has been welcomed by MSPs from all parties and has garnered support from various student bodies. Turning a sympathetic hearing into a policy change will be no easy step. The legal profession has to show it is committed to equal access by setting in motion long-term changes to the structure of training. But in the short term we need to stand together to ask the Government to fulfill its responsibilities to equal access and provide a support package ensuring ability and motivation are the only relevant factors for anyone, regardless of background, considering a career in Scots Law.

Tim Haddow
Law Students’ Council
The University of Edinburgh
@TimHaddow

Tim Haddow is an LLB student at the University of Edinburgh, and a member of the Law Students’ Council, the elected representative body for students at the university’s School of Law. More information on the Law Students’ Council’s campaign on DPLP funding is available at http://dplpfunding.wordpress.com/latest-updates/

We are pleased to welcome Glasgow University law graduate, Christopher Agnew, as he pens this incisive guest blog post regarding some of the challenges facing prospective trainee solicitors in Scotland in the current uncertain economic climate.

Entering into a life in law, as I did in 2005, I would expect that my peers would have thought little about the prospects of entering into the profession following the culmination of their university life; it was arguably a guarantee as the Training Contract levels were steadily increasing through 2004-2007.

Following the Economic downturn in 2008 the Legal Sector, as well as many other private sectors, has been greatly affected and has accordingly tightened the reins on spending and staffing levels. As at November 2008, the level of Training Contracts registered by the Law Society of Scotland had fallen to 592 and plummeted to 427 in the following year.

One may argue that there is a direct correlation between the economy and the uptake rate of Trainees. As the economy started to level out, the training contracts were on the rise – up to 527 in 2010 – but then followed a second dip in 2011, to 93% of those in 2010.

There are various issues affecting prospective trainees in the current climate, over and above the current climate. One may argue that the competition has never been greater for one position, with literally hundreds of people applying for a solitary place. The challenge to stand out as a candidate even before interview is made harder still because of the graduation rate of those with a Diploma in Legal Practice. In recent times, it would seem that where the number of Diploma graduates and in fact, Diploma Providers has seen a gradual increase, the number of training contracts has declined over time and shows little sign of significant increase.

The Law Society of Scotland has sought to support those seeking a training contract with the introduction of various alternatives to the two year traineeship. The idea of a part-time training contract as well as a flexible training contract, whereby two or more firms take on the responsibility of training one individual, are seen as attractive alternatives given the current challenges in employment. On the face of it, one may see this as a motivating factor in encouraging employers to take on trainees and play their part in shaping the future of the Legal Profession. Some may argue however, that where the individual is responsible for seeking out two or more firms who are willing to enter into a flexible arrangement, it may be seen as a disincentive to those seeking a training contract – surely searching for one training contract is hard enough, without having to try harder to convince two firms to split the responsibility?!

Where payment in concerned, the Law Society is due to reconsider the recommended minimum level for a first and second year trainee in or around June 2012. I feel that it is important to note that the current position is one where the wage is a recommended minimum and therefore, law firms are free to offer any level of remuneration in which they can afford and also enter into negotiation with their prospective trainee regarding a mutually agreeable wage level. Prior to their consideration of wage levels for 2012-2013, the Council of the Law Society has responded to various queries regarding payment levels of Trainees, and in particular their stance on Training Contracts for no remuneration, with a decision which will guarantee new trainees no lower than the National Minimum Wage throughout their Training Contract.

The challenges facing those seeking Training Contract are arguably the greatest they have ever been. On one hand, the Professional Body is offering alternatives to encourage firms to take on trainees knowing that it will not be a two year commitment, and on the other hand, they are effectively nullifying any negotiation which may take place between the employer and employee regarding wages, by setting a definitive minimum; a minimum which some small to medium sized firms may not be able to afford in the current challenging economic climate.

On a personal note, I graduated with honours in 2010 and successfully completed the Diploma in Legal Practice in 2011 at Glasgow University. Following completion I have sought and found various Legal Work Experience placements offering a taster of general practice however have yet to find that elusive Training Contract. I am confident that the number of Training Contracts will gradually increase over the next three to five years, however the longer the stall in Training Contract numbers, the greater the opportunity for Diploma Providers to flood the market with future traineeship hunters.

Christopher T Agnew

Christopher Agnew is a 24yr old Diploma Graduate currently seeking a Training Contract, living in Motherwell, Scotland and can be found on various Social Media Platforms including LinkedIn – http://uk.linkedin.com/pub/christopher-agnew/4b/8a6/41b and Twitter – @agnew1_law. Since completing the Diploma In Legal Practice, he has sought out various work experience placement, including most recently, 8 months with a Wishaw Practitioner, spent in the Court department and involving matters including Civil Litigation, Commercial and Residential Conveyancing, Civil Disputes, Matrimonial and Child Law Issues and Private Client Work.

The view expressed in the preceding article are merely social observation and any personal views contained therein are entirely his own.

I recently read ‘Towards a Unified Theory of Similaw Facts Evidence in Scots Law’ by Peter Duff, a man whose articles I have enjoyed reading since I started studying law. However, I was particularly concerned by the manner in which he confuses the Moorov doctrine with similar facts evidence.

Duff argues that both the Moorov and Howden doctrines result in a system whereby Scottish law permits similar facts evidence.[1] This is sometimes called collateral evidence and is evidence which is out with the circumstances of the charge before the court. An example of this would be introducing evidence of previous convictions in order to taint the character of the accused. Such evidence has long been inadmissible under Scots law and this writer would argue that Peter Duff is incorrect to state that Moorov is a type of collateral evidence. This is fundamentally because Moorov is concerned not with separate cases involving the same perpetrator, but incidents which are part of the same course of conduct, albeit with a passage of time between them.[2]

Open Justice Week launched at the start of this week (27 February) and already the Open Justice website is alive with some great pieces of legal blogging from the Scottish Courts.

As explained in the Open Justice launch statement,

A fundamental principle of law is: “Not only must justice be done; it must also be seen to be done.”

Lord Hewart said this in 1924, 88 years later the question is: Does this still hold true?

The Open Justice Project asks that question and aims to provide a snapshot of the state of British law in 2012.

Half-way through the week, the goal of the project remains to get writers, legal professionals and members of the public to collaborate using social media to share their experiences of a week in the life of the legal system.

If looking for further inspiration about why it’s a great idea to get involved in the project, particularly if you are a law student or lawyer, please do see my top 5 reasons for young lawyers to get blogging post on Pupillage Blog. I’ve been judging moots at the start of this week – it’s good to see another year of capable Scots law students going through their first year of law school. Many of those students are more than capable of providing great blog posts on legal matters. It is hoped that more continue to spare some of their free time to get involved with social media, particularly by engaging through legal tweeting, LinkedIn and legal blogging.

To get involved you can email the Open Justice team at openjusticeuk@gmail.com  join them on Facebook, follow them on twitter through the hashtag #oj_uk and share their posts to your social networks.

Best wishes to the Open Justice team for a strong finish to the week.

Lord Wallace of Tankerness QC, the Advocate General for Scotland, delivered a speech at Glasgow University on Friday 20 January 2012, outlining why the Scottish Parliament cannot currently legislate for a referendum on independence at present.  Lord Wallace also set out how a legal, fair and decisive referendum can be achieved if the Scottish Government works with the UK Government.

Useful links

Some excellent live tweeting yesterday by Scottish lawyer Philip Hannay from the Lord Wallace lecture visible through the hashtag Philip created on Twitter – #scotlandsconstitutionalfuture

Blog post on the ObiterJ blog: Scotland’s Constitutional Future: an influential Scottish voice

Herald Scotland article on Lord Wallace’s speech, emphasising Lord Wallace’s conclusions that it would be “a matter of great concern if the Scottish Government, as a democratically-elected body, were to seek to challenge the rule of law”.

See The Office of the Advocate General’s website for further updates.

Further thoughts welcome in the comments section below.

A leading provider of legal know-how & market intelligence for lawyers, Practical Law Company (“PLC”) has just started to publish online various Scots law books previously only available in hard copy.  The list and publishing schedule is here: http://uk.practicallaw.com/about/browsebooks#scotslaw

This is a welcome move in legal publishing as more and more great legal information is being made available online (even if for a modest subscription fee). Hopefully in the future, more of this material (particularly the older material) will be fully available for free and fully searchable via search engines like Google, while properly rewarding and recognising the authors and contributors.

ScotsLawBlog has also produced a list of Scots Law books (in hardback) here.

I am pleased to welcome Mr Anis Waiz, Solicitor and Partner at Manchester-based law firm, Mohindra Maini LLP, as he pens a very comprehensive guest blog post on the recent Outer House decision of Cheshire Mortgage Corporation Ltd & Anor v. Grandison & Ors [2011] CSOH 157 (23 September 2011). The below is an edited extract of an article which originally appeared in Today’s Conveyancer on 12 October 2011.

Introduction

This case concerned the attempted recover by lenders of monies arising out of fraudulent mortgage applications. Of real interest to lawyers, lenders and insurer’s was that the case applied principles of law more commonly found in the English jurisdiction, the issue of warranty of authority.  Did such principles apply in the Scottish jurisdiction?

Background

The reader is referred to the judgment for the full background facts.

The lenders were the subject of mortgage frauds. The fraudster applied for a loan pretending to be Mr and Mrs X owning property which they offered as security. When the loan was approved, security over the property was executed.

The lenders advanced the money to the fraudsters, believing them to be Mr and Mrs X. The fraudsters subsequently disappeared. Without an obvious remedy the lenders turned to the solicitors who acted for the purported borrowers.

The lenders alleged that the solicitors warranted that they had the authority of the individuals who owned the properties over which standard securities were purportedly granted.

The Solicitors recognising the doctrine of a solicitor giving an implied warranty of authority, argued the warranty does not go that far.

Warranty of authority

The leading textbook on agency Bowstead & Reynolds, 16^th ed. (1996) at p.592, para.9-057, sets out the principle

“Where a person, by word or conduct, represents that he has authority to act on behalf of another, and a third party is induced by such representation to act in a manner in which he would not have acted if that representation had not been made, the first-mentioned person is deemed to warrant that the representation is true, and is liable for any loss caused to such third party by a breach of that implied warranty, even if he acted in good faith, under a mistaken belief that he had such authority“

The doctrine is not confined to cases where a contract is entered into by a person professing to act on behalf of a principal. It applies to every case where, by words or conduct, the person purporting to act as agent represents that he has authority to act on behalf of another, and a third party is induced by such representation to act in a way in which he would not otherwise have acted but for that representation having been made.

The law of breach of warranty of authority is to be found in the English Judgment of Willes J in Collen v Wright [1857] 8 E&B647 at p.657:

“I am of opinion that a person, who induces another to contract with him as the agent or a third party by an unqualified assertion of his being authorised to act as such agent, is answerable to the person who so contracts for any damages which he may sustain by reason of the assertion of authority being untrue. This is not the case of a bare mis-statement by a person not bound by any duty to give information. The fact that the professed agent honestly thinks that he has authority affects the moral character of his act; but his moral innocence, so far as the person whom he has induced to contract is concerned, in no way aids such person or alleviates the inconvenience and damage which he sustains. The obligation arising in such a case is well expressed by saying that a person, professing to contract as agent for another, impliedly, if not expressly, undertakes to and promises the person who enters into such contract, upon the faith of the professed agent being duly authorised, that the authority which he professes to have does in point of fact exist. The fact of entering into the transaction with a professed agent, as such, is good consideration for the promise”.

That statement of the law has been accepted and applied consistently  in the English courts since then see for example Penn v Bristol & West Building Society [1997] 1 WLR1356 .

Did this principle apply in the Scottish jurisdiction? In this case the court noted that despite the researches of counsel there was no reported Scottish case in which a party has been held liable for breach of warranty of authority.

However there were  numerous references in leading Scottish textbooks  and in  decided cases which make it clear that the principles were fully recognised in Scots law: see Gloag, Contract (2^nd Ed) at pp.155-157, Anderson v Croall (1903) 6F 153, Rederi Aktiebolaget Nordstjernan v Christian Salvesen & Co [1903] 6F 64 (IH), [1905] 7F (HL) 101, Irving v Burns 1915 SC 260 and Scott v JB Livingston & Nicol 1990 SLT 305.

The Scope of the Authority

What was the scope? The Court noted two crucial points

1          The existence and the scope of the warranty of authority is fact dependent.  Waller LJ    in Penn v Bristol & West Building Society at p.1363B-C: noted

“In truth as I see it, the question whether a warranty of authority has been given rests on a proper analysis of the facts in any given situation, and not on any pre-conceived notions as to what is essential as part of the factual analysis. Of course there is no issue that to establish a warranty of authority as with any other collateral warranty there must be proved a contract under which a promise is made either expressly or by implication to the promisee, for which promise the promisee provides consideration. But consideration can be supplied by the promisee entering into some transaction with a third party in a warranty of authority case just as it can in any other collateral warranty case. Furthermore, the promise can be made to a wide number of people or simply to one person, again all depending on the facts”

 In each case one had to look at the relationship between the parties, examine closely what was said, expressly or impliedly, by the agent in the context of that relationship, how what was said was could reasonably have been understood by the other party.

2          Where an implied warranty of authority has been held to exist, the scope of that authority has generally been regarded as very limited. This point is made in a number of cases. In SEB Trygg Liv AB v Manches, a case concerned with a solicitor’s warranty of authority in acting for the claimants in arbitration proceedings, Buxton LJ held

“In considering these submissions it is important to bear in mind that generally a solicitor conducting proceedings does not warrant what he says or does on behalf of his client. Thus he does not warrant that his client, the named party to the proceedings, has title to sue, is solvent, has a good cause of action or defence or has any other attribute asserted on his behalf.

 The solicitor relies upon his client’s instructions for all these things, as he will normally do for naming his client correctly. As he gives no warranty as to the accuracy of his instructions generally, it is difficult to see why the naming of his client should be treated as an exception…”

Similar remarks were noted in a Scottish case. Lord Drummond Young in Frank Houlgate Investment Co Ltd v Biggart Baillie LLP 2010 SLT 527 at para.[27]:

“What is significant in the formulation of the principle, however, is that the supposed agent, A, represents that he has authority to act for B in a particular transaction, with the result that the third party, C, is induced to act on that representation. Thus the representation relates to the person for whom the supposed agent purports to act. It does not relate to the capacity in which that person, the supposed principal, will enter into the transaction, or as to the property that that person holds, or as to that person’s title to any property”

Breach

The court considered whether in this case the solicitors were liable for breach of warranty of authority. The lenders contend that the solicitors impliedly warranted that they acted for “Mr and Mrs X of a particular property”.

The lenders accepted that any warranty of authority to be implied in such circumstances does not, on any view of the decided cases, extend beyond what may be called “the identity” of the person for whom the agent purports to act. It does not extend to his capacity, his ownership of assets or his other attributes. As was noted in Trygg, the implied warranty does not extend to the solvency of the person for whom the agent purports to act, not, in the context of litigation for example, to the strength of his case or his title to sue.

 Similarly, as was made clear in Frank Houlgate Investment, in a loan or property transaction, the implied warranty does not extend to ownership or title to the property in question, nor its value.

Thus the lenders argued the warranty by the solicitors that they act “for Mr and Mrs X of a particular property”, is a warranty as to the identity of the person for whom they act.

The question was whether, in the particular circumstances of this case, a warranty to this effect could be implied. The Court noted some key issues as follows:

1          the borrowers had approached the lenders for a loan (in one case via the lender’s website, and in the other direct to an underwriter at the lenders and then, on his direction, via a broker);

2          the lenders had made a decision in principle to lend to these borrowers, and had issued an Offer Letter to them.

3          the lenders had sought and obtained proof of identification directly from the borrowers

4          the lenders had instructed its own Solicitors to act on their behalf to prepare the necessary security and other documentation

5          by the time the borrowers’ solicitors became involved, the lenders knew who they were (or thought they were) dealing with. They had made the decision in principle to lend to those individuals. The solicitors were instructed by the borrowers for a limited purpose, namely to help draw up the relevant loan and security documentation and to liaise with the Lenders solicitors.

The court held that it was difficult to see any room for any implied representation by the solicitors as to the identity of the borrowers for whom they were acting, other than that they were acting for the people with whom the lenders were already engaged in a process of finalising a loan transaction. Borrowing from Willes J’s formulation of the warranty in Collen v Wright, the solicitors here in each case did not more than warrant “that the authority which they professed to have did in point of fact exist”.

The authority which they professed to have was this, that they were instructed by the borrowers who were already known to the lenders to assist in drawing up the loan and security documentation.

There was no implied warranty going beyond this. Therefore  the claim for breach of warranty of authority failed in each case.

There was also a claim by the lenders to enforce a  letter of obligation. That claimed failed for reasons outside the scope of this note.

Conclusion

A very fine subtle distinction is being made here. The solicitors were not warranting as to the identity of their client.

It is well to remember the principle again  Where a person, by word or conduct, represents that he has authority to act on behalf of another, and a third party is induced by such representation to act in a manner in which he would not have acted if that representation had not been made, the first-mentioned person is deemed to warrant that the representation is true, and is liable for any loss caused to such third party by a breach of that implied warranty, even if he acted in good faith, under a mistaken belief that he had such authority.

I am delighted to announce that ScotsLawBlog has been named as one of LexisNexis’ Top 25 International & Foreign Law Blogs of 2011.

For those other keen bloggers or for those considering blogging for the first time, it may be surprising to learn that ScotsLawBlog has only recently marked its 1 year anniversary. Such is the power of social media.

The next stage

What is the next stage for ScotsLawBlog and WardblawG? Now in their second year, the aim is to publish even more legal content (I am, for instance, in the middle of writing a post about the recent significant delict case of Anthony Phee v Gordon & another) in addition to material that helps bloggers and other legal professionals to share more information. While I have a full-time role as a search and social media marketing manager at Moore Legal Technology, helping law firms across the UK to generate business online, I continue to tutor private law at Glasgow University and commercial law at Strathclyde University.

As an aside, on Tuesday this week I attended the opening of Strathclyde University’s Centre for Internet Law and Policy. It was interesting to speak to one of the IP/IT partners at the law firm where I qualified as a solicitor. After several discussions, he said “All the best with the new career”. I had never really thought about what I do as a new career – rather an evolution of career – but I suppose that is a good way of looking at it. For any law students sceptical of the advice “there are many things you can do with a law degree”, I would suggest they broaden their horizons.

Other excellent blogs on Scots Law

There are some other great blogs on Scots Law that merit mentions also. Absolvitor by Iain Nisbet, for instance, was also named as a Top 25 International & Foreign Law Blog of 2011. One blog which has been very impressive recently is Scots Law Thoughts by Paul McConville. Other Scottish blawgs listed by Iain Nisbet at the beginning of the year  are also to be followed.

Forwarding thinking Scottish lawyers, Brian Inkster and the Inksters team also write an excellent series of blogs on Scots Law - a great example of how a law firm can and should write legal content to keep clients and potential clients up-to-date with relevant legal updates. Brian is, of course, also the author of The Time Blawg which provides updates on the past, present and future of legal practice, not only in Scotland but around the world.

Moore Legal Technology additionally assists law firms with blogging within their own websites with the aim both of sharing relevant legal information & news and of generating business for the firms. Austin Lafferty’s blog, for instance, is an example of a prominent Scottish legal blog. Some other Moore Legal Technology clients run successful blogs and it is hoped that continued growth of these into 2012 helps to share even more expert legal content.

There are many, many more Scottish law firms that write blogs and it is hoped that moving into 2012, their investment in social media will allow their online presence to expand to the point where they can increase their international presence.

Starting out with blogging?

I have written recently about useful tips for blogging and, indeed, I run a guest blogging site at http://www.youblawg.com/. For anyone looking to start a law blog, integrate a blog within their website or improve their blogging, please do get in touch.

Best wishes,

Gavin Ward,

Founder of ScotsLawBlog.

I am very pleased to announce that ScotsLawBlog has been nominated as a candidate for the Top 25 International & Foreign Law Blogs of 2011. And it’s great to see that this is not the only Scottish law blog listed: Absolvitor by Iain Nisbet is also nominated for the prize. Iain had outlined earlier this year that Scottish legal blogging was in a healthy state and I think that other Scottish law blogs may also be worth consideration for nomination.

A leading global provider of content-enabled workflow solutions, with particular specialism working with the legal profession, LexisNexis will be announcing the final list of the 25 honourees after the comment period for nominations has closed on November 11.

Comment and vote

Please do vote for ScotsLawBlog and/or your favourite international law blog by following LexisNexis’s instructions:-

To “talk up” or nominate your favorite Int’l & Foreign blog, you’ll need to be a registered community member and be logged in. If you haven’t registered previously, follow this link  to create a new registration or use your sign in credentials from your favorite social media site. Registration is free! Once you are logged in, scroll all the way to the very bottom of this page. You should see a comment box… Add a comment in the box at the bottom of the page to vote or nominate your favorite blog, and that’s it!

Please do also share this news with your contacts and please visit Top 25 International & Foreign Law Blogs of 2011 and comment at the bottom of the page.

Your support is, as always, very much appreciated.

Best wishes,

Gavin Ward,

Founder of ScotsLawBlog.

80 years on, Donoghue v Stevenson [1932] AC 562 remains one of the world’s most famous delict/tort cases.

To celebrate the 80th anniversary of Lord Atkin’s judgment, there is to be an international conference on May 25 & 26, 2012. This should generate wide interest and indeed attendance from around the legal world.

The conference celebrates inter alia Lord Atkin’s immortal words:

Who then in law is my neighbour? The answer seems to be persons who are so closely and directly affected by my act that I ought reasonably to have them in contemplation as being so affected when I am directing my mind to the acts or omissions which are called in question.

For more on the case see Donoghue v Stevenson on Wikipedia and an introduction to Donoghue v Stevenson on YouTube.

Around the blawgs

For more on the conference itself and details of the Call for Papers submission deadline of 1 November 2011, please see these blog posts:-

Edinburgh Centre for Commercial Law
Faculty Law Conference Updates
Wall Street Journal
Law Professors